





A Question of Order: The Role of collective Taste as a Strategy to cope with Demand Uncertainty in the Womenswear Fashion Industry 

Abstract
Though strong branding and a distinctive product range are often identified as important factors for companies’ economic success (see, e.g., Robinson [1999]) many UK womenswear retailers offer surprisingly similar products. The author argues that product sameness amongst many high street womenswear retailers in the UK is a deliberate strategy employed by industry practitioners to limit demand uncertainty.

Based on an empirical study of UK high street womenswear retailers the author argues that the womenswear fashion industry, like other industries operating in markets faced by high levels of demand uncertainty (Crane 1992), has adopted strategies to minimise economic risks. The author explores how fashion information created by companies/groups in the quaternary industry sector is used as inspirational sources for fashion workers at retailing level and contributes to the development of a collective taste amongst them. Collective taste in the context of this research is seen not as a by-product of interaction as theorised by Blumer (1969), but as a strategy to cope with the inherent demand uncertainty experienced by firms operating in the womenswear market and as a means for establishing some orderliness in the fashion system.

Keywords:
Fashion industry; demand uncertainty; collective taste; information loop; quaternary industry sector  

1.      Introduction
Due to the nature of its products culture industries face high levels of demand uncertainty. Whereas producers, middlemen and consumers of ‘material’ goods – goods serving utilitarian rather than aesthetic needs – can reach an objective verdict on the quality of a product, for example based on its technical performance, cultural products or non-material goods, cannot be judged in this way, but rather have to somehow capture consumers’ imaginations and desires (Blumer 1969; Hirsch 1972). It is therefore not surprising that culture industries face high levels of demand uncertainty on their input and output boundaries. As Dempster (2005, 1) points out ‘there exists … one point of agreement amongst policy makers, practitioners and academics – … the creative sectors are characterised by extremely high levels of uncertainty. This makes participation (at all levels) risky… [,] rewards highly uncertain … [and] creative marketplaces … extremely difficult to predict.’ Indeed, Goldman’s (1984, 39) often cited statement that ‘nobody knows anything’ relates to the fact that cultural workers are generally unable to predict the success of current projects at an early stage. Demand uncertainty has been shown in the literature (e.g. Caves 2000; de Vany 2004; Thompson 2010) as being a fundamental property of culture producing industries and as shaping their organisational set-up and the working practices of its workforce (Crane 1992; Dempster 2006; Hirsch 1972).  
Demand uncertainty is felt strongly in the fashion industry, as the very nature of this industry is centred on continual change – it produces temporal distinction on a synchronic level, by producing clothes that fulfil consumers’ desire for social distinction in any given season, as well as on a diachronic level, i.e. by producing garments that differ from the ones of the previous season (Bourdieu avec Delsaut, 1975). The level of fashion sensitivity of a fashion system determines the impact of seasonal fluctuations and demand uncertainty it has to face – this makes womenswear, which has a higher fashion content than other clothing systems, the most volatile segment of the fashion industry. Moreover, Braham (1997, 121) points out womenswear is unique, because ‘in no other industry is the management of fashionability so central to its institutions and structures’. In order to cope with the high level of demand uncertainty, the womenswear industry has developed flexible production processes, labour relations and interfirm arrangements conducive to coping with fluctuations in demand (Fine and Leopold 1993; Godley 1998). Moreover, similar to other culture industries (Hirsch 1972; Ryan and Peterson 1982), womenswear retailers employ sequential selection processes at key stages in the product development cycle to filter out and minimise oversupply (Schulz, 2008). This article seeks to show that collective taste can be seen as a further strategy to cope with demand uncertainty and to bring order to the fashion industry.

2.	Collective taste and (social) order
In his seminal paper ‘Fashion: From Class Differentiation to Collective Selection’ Blumer (1969) posits that ‘…the setting or determination of fashion takes place … through an intense process of selection (Blumer 1969, 278). He found that fashion buyers converge ‘independently of each other and without knowledge of each other’s selections’ (Blumer 1969, 279) on 6-8 out of one hundred or more designs. Blumer (1969, 282) sought to explain this ‘mysterious … process of collective selection’ through buyers’ intense immersion in the world of fashion and their myriad interactions with other fashion practitioners, which he believed facilitated the development of shared sensitivities and tastes that ‘guided and sensitized their perceptions and … channelled their judgements and choices’ (Blumer 1969, 279). This implies that taste is an active force that shapes social actors’ experiences and directs their lines of action, e.g. it guides their decisions to reject, select and form objects according to its standards. Indeed, for Blumer fashion is neither trivial nor inconsequential – it not only acts as a constraint to choice, but is a central mechanism in forming social order: 

…fashion introduces a conspicuous measure of unanimity and uniformity in what would otherwise be a markedly fragmented arrangement. If all competing models enjoyed similar acceptance … there would be a veritable ‘Tower of Babel’ consequence. Fashion introduces order in a potentially anarchic and moving present ... [by] narrowly limit[ing] the range of variability… In this respect fashion performs in a moving society a function which custom performs in a settled society. […] Fashion should be recognised as a central mechanism in forming social order.
(Blumer 1969, 289-290, italics in original)

Although Blumer’s analysis provides important insights into the connection between fashion, collective taste and social order, he curiously omits to take the ‘elaborate institutional apparatus’ (Davis 1992, 120) of the fashion industry into account in these processes. Indeed, the institutional apparatus of the fashion industry only enters Blumer’s analysis briefly through his considerations of the role of prestige figures and the (fashion) elite​[1]​ and his observations (i) that their endorsement of a design can increase the likelihood of its acceptance and (ii) that they affect, not control, the public’s incipient taste. While he recognises the importance of interaction in the formation of collective taste amongst fashion workers, he does not consider the strategic dimensions of these interactions. As Davis (1991, 17) points out collective selection is ‘strategically bounded collective selection […] [as] fashions … are the product of elaborate processes of compromise, negotiation, adjustment and risk-taking played out within and amongst the subworlds comprising the larger social world that is the fashion industry.’ Schulz (2008), for example, has shown that fashion workers have different occupational (and individual) outlooks that impact on their garment selection and can give rise to conflicts. Practitioners seek to overcome these differences by drawing on a shared image of their (imagined) customers’ likes and dislikes (Schulz 2008). This latter observation points to another weakness in Blumer’s observations: he locates the fashion phenomenon at the level of mass taste and argues that for something to be in fashion it has to correspond to the fashion consuming public’s emergent taste. However, consumers’ incipient taste is ‘imagined’ (Schulz 2008) or ‘anticipated and interpreted mass taste, the anticipations and interpretations themselves having been filtered through the not altogether harmonious values and interests of the fashion industry’s subworlds’ (Davis 1991, 17, italics in original). 
Meyer (2000, 33) also picks up on the role of interpretation and the importance of the institutional apparatus when describing taste formation as a ‘collective interpretive activity that … is shaped by culturally available rhetorics of aesthetic judgement’, such as ‘fashionable – dated’, ‘common – sophisticated’, and that is played out against the backdrop of institutional constraints. The notion of rhetorics directs one’s attention to the processes that are involved in legitimating and selecting specific features of an aesthetic object thus producing diverse taste judgements, while on another level it can be seen to organise and structure one’s reality.  Meyer (2000, 51) observed that culturally dominant rhetorics impact taste-making ‘by steering the collective imagination and interpretation of new symbols one way or another’ and maintains that in order to understand these processes one needs to look at ‘the operating institutional context, the balance of power among participating collective actors, and their selective use of the available legitimating rhetorics’​[2]​. 
Applying these observations to the fashion industry it could be argued that the quaternary sector of Western fashion systems, which includes fashion information and consultancy services, is dedicated to the shaping of culturally available fashion rhetorics and communicating this information to clients in the primary, secondary and tertiary sector​[3]​. In this respect the quaternary fashion sector performs important functions both as a gatekeeper to and distributor of information. Finkelstein (1998, 80), for example, argues that ‘fashion is an organisation of knowledge based on restricted access to goods and services’ and that social actors’ ability to identify the fashionable reflects their cultural capital. This suggests that well-connected, dedicated providers of fashion information can gain expert status in the fashion system and enjoy high ‘fashion capital’ (Rocamora 2002), which may prompt less well-informed players to follow their advice. Indeed, drawing on Moureau and Sagot-Duvauroux’s (2010) work on contemporary art, Sagot-Duvauroux (2011, 44) argues that differential knowledge may led social actors to follow the opinions of those ‘agents who are believed to be in the know … These informational cascades may be strategic when the opinion leaders are interested in the result of the cascade.’ As the following discussion will show it is not only the various dedicated providers of fashion information who have a strategic interest in the formation of collective taste, but also the recipients of this information who use it to follow the ‘herd’ rather than to carve their own niche of distinctiveness. 

3.      Sample
This article is based on (i) documentary research of primary data collected from websites of key groups and companies within the quaternary sector of the fashion industry and (ii) empirical research of UK womenswear retailers. The empirical data stems from nineteen semi-structured interviews​[4]​ with designers, buyers and merchandisers of UK based multiple womenswear retailers (N=12) with ten or more retail outlets. As the majority of womenswear retailers do not manufacture their own garments some insights into retailer-manufacturer relationships were gained by conducting a small number of interviews with manufacturer-based designers (N=3). Interviews lasted between 25–75 minutes and were conducted at interviewees’ place of work. Interviews covered six broad themes, namely (1) interviewees’ biography, (2) organisational structure of company, (3) forecasting, (4) garment selection, (5) conflicts and (6) technology. In order to ensure that the questions were of interest and relevance to interviewees two slightly different interviewing guides were devised: one for retail- and manufacturer-based designers, and a second for buyers and merchandisers. The data was analysed using thematic analysis (May 2011).

3.1	Design-led and buying-led retailers
Following interviewees’ own explicit or implicit definition of their company’s organizational structure, the sample was divided into design-led (N=7) and buying-led retailers (N=5). The prefix ‘design’ and ‘buying’ indicates which occupational group is most influential in shaping a company’s garment range and reveals basic differences in the organizational set-up of companies (Schulz 2008). For example, in companies that have been categorized as ‘design-led’ the designers are the occupational group whose choices determine the characteristics of the product range to a greater extent than buyers and merchandisers’ decisions.  Designers in design-led retailers design the majority of the range themselves and are largely responsible for creating the style and brand image of the company. In contrast, buyers in buying- led retailers are not only the largest occupational group​[5]​, but it is their decisions that shape the range: they liaise closely with manufacturers, decide what is being designed and which garments will be selected. 
	Another key difference between design-led and buying-led companies lies in their approach to garment design. Whereas design-led companies predominantly design in-house from ‘scratch’, buying-led companies’ ranges are ‘bought in’, i.e. built from various buying samples. The differences in methods can be highlighted by the following statement:

…we do a lot of sketching… I start with a blank piece of paper, whereas some people tend to start with a bunch of garments [manufacturers’ buying samples or garments bought from other retailers] and they kind of piece them together. 
	(Sophia, Designer, design-led retailer)

This difference between design-led and buying-led retailers’ approach to garment design will be revisited in the context of fashion workers’ practice of copying others (see section 4.2.1). 

4.	Findings and Discussion
4.1	The role of the quaternary sector in legitimising taste 
The various fashion information and consultancy services of the quaternary sector of Western fashion systems perform important functions both as gatekeepers to and distributors of fashion information. They are instrumental in shaping and legitimising culturally available fashion rhetorics and in communicating this information to clients throughout the industry system. 
In terms of the timing of the fashion cycle the earliest impact of such institutional gatekeepers on the formation of collective taste can be felt in the selection of colours. Colour forecasts were first commercially produced in 1917 and have become more widely used in the 1970s (King 2011). Colour forecasts aimed predominantly at the primary sector (i.e. yarn and fabric manufacturers) are released approximately two years ahead of season. The role colour forecasting agencies play in the formation of (colour) taste can be seen by looking at the working practices of the International Colour Authority (ICA), Intercolor and the British Textile and Colour Group (BTCG). 
Established in 1966, the International Colour Authority consist of delegates from international textile and paint companies as well as self-employed consultants who select approximately 30 colours that are divided into trend moods or seasonal variations (Costantino 1998) to make up colour reports which are released 24 months ahead of season. The arrival of the ICA and similar organisations in the mid-1960s coincided with the entrance of large international chemical companies into the textile industry – both events changed the textile industry and the way colours are predicted dramatically. Prior to the mid-sixties

…the situation for predicting colours was akin to the legendary Tower of Babel, there was no leadership and no co-ordination. Trade associations, yarn producers and a multitude of manufacturing companies throughout the world all issued conflicting 'colour cards' forecasting trends six to twelve months ahead of the season.
(International Colour Authority 2012)

Thus, the emergence of the ICA’s and other colour forecasting services can be seen to have brought a degree of orderliness and stability to colour forecasting, without which large-scale businesses would struggle to operate economically far in advance of the season. Indeed, this desire to impose order on the colour taste formation is echoed by Intercolor​[6]​ (2014) which produce a bi-annual international colour card reflecting the consensus researched by its members:
 
For the purpose of seasonal coordination and standardization of colours in the textile and fashion industry … it was decided that information would be constantly exchanged between each nation through discussions on the basic fashion trends and through activities of the standing secretariat.

Currently, Intercolor has 14 member countries from across Europe and Asia which are represented exclusively by non-commercial national organizations ‘specialized in color coordination for the textile and fashion industries and working in that field in their own countries’ (Intercolor 2014)​[7]​. Great Britain, for example, is represented by a member of the British Textile and Colour Group (BTCG), which itself consists of textile designers from Scottish and Yorkshire mills who establish seasonal palettes in bi-annual meetings. These palettes are then shared with global colour forecasters and eventually published by the ‘UK Fashion & Textile Association [which] is the most inclusive British network for fashion and textile companies’ (UK Fashion and Textile Association 2014).
The above discussion suggests that there exists a complex information loop between the various national and international groups that are tasked with the development of consensual colour cards or palettes and that these groups are highly influential in the formation of collective colour taste. This is summed up well in a comment posted by a member of the BTCG to The Women’s Room Blog on November 3, 2011:
Yesterday I spent the day talking about colours for Autumn Winter 2013 /14 with the British Textile and Colour Group. […] If you’ve ever wondered just who comes up with the colours that you buy in the shops each season, it’s us. So next time you get annoyed that the shops are full of a green that reminds you of your fifth year school uniform, you can blame us!!

While organisations such as the ICA, Intercolor and the BTCG work up to two years ahead of season and aim their predications at the primary sector, there are also numerous specialized colour forecasting services aimed at the secondary and tertiary sectors. These agencies provide companies with both long-term colour predications as well as updated colour cards​[8]​ that they issue between 12 - 6 months ahead of season. For example, Pantone publishes a series of colour cards aimed at different industries or market segments 18 months in advance, while also publishing the PANTONE® Fashion Color Report approximately six months ahead of season.  This report is based on the analysis of trends from New York Fashion Week and identifies 10 key colours for women’s and men’s fashion alongside designer sketches and other visual materials. Thus, by the time high street womenswear retailers finalise their colour selection (approximately 6-3 months ahead of season) they can draw on updated colour palettes, examples of how colours have been translated into actual garments on the catwalks and a plethora of reports and representations in various types of media aimed at both fashion practitioners as well as the fashion-interested public. 
	Of course colour is only one aspect fashion practitioners consider when putting collections together and similar fashion information loops exist in relation to materials, themes, silhouettes etc. Fashion forecasting services are instrumental in providing the retailing sector with long-term trend predictions (ranging from 2-10 years ahead of season) and up-to-the-minute trend reports containing observations, depictions and analysis of the latest fashion shows, red carpet events or street fashions (Rousso 2012). Trend reports contain concrete, ‘tangible’ information of what fashion trendsetters are actually doing and allow retailers to identify key trends and seasonal ‘must haves’ easily and with a view to adapting them to fit their market. One fashion forecasting company, for example, describes their reports as ‘Runway Roadmaps’ set out to help clients

…make sense out of the myriad of runway messages each season. The Runway Roadmap presents four viable trends for the season ahead, each with color palettes, key items, accessories, and inspirations from art, fashion history, pop culture and film. [As well as providing] ‘speed to market’ … reports to develop items for quick turnaround. We call out the apparel and accessory items that you need to get to your customers now. Each report includes flat sketches, fabric and detail suggestions and styling direction to spark multiple item sales.
Stylesight (2014)

	By selecting a small number of ‘viable’ trends, i.e. trends that can be easily adapted for the high street, Stylesight seek to legitimise them as fashion.​[9]​ Although no cross-comparison between forecasting reports has been made to ascertain the extent to which forecasters overlap in their proclamations of what is fashion (and by extension what is not fashion), the fact that many (buying-led) retailers draw on the same, narrow range of forecasting services (as we shall see in the next section) strongly suggests that forecasting reports contribute to the formation of collective taste amongst retail clients. Indeed, as Wilson and Taylor (1989, 219) point out the widespread use of professional forecasters since the 1980s has created a paradox, because it ‘has led not to more choice but to greater conformity and sameness as the results of the predictions are mass marketed and retailed all over the world’. This link between the use of forecasting agencies and conformity is also evident from the interview data. One interviewee maintains that, while designers 

…in the past … used to say ‘Okay, it’s going to be flowers and it’s going to be these colours …’ … now it’s much more cut-throat than that … [and we] have to have … [a] particular type of print cause everybody else will have it.
(Faye, Designer, buying-led retailer)

	So, while forecasting agencies used to provide fairly vague long-term predications that required considerable interpretive input from designers to translate into concrete patterns, silhouettes and so forth, today’s web-based fashion forecasting agencies provide almost instantaneous coverage of key fashion events. Although this up-to-the-minute coverage and trend analysis allows retailers to converge on viable trends and eliminates some of the risks associated with forward production, the above quote also suggests that technological innovation can stifle the creative process. It is interesting to note that product sameness, which is commonly associated with Fordist types of mass production, occurs in an industry whose reactivity and reflexivity would make it an ideal example of an industry system adhering to the principles of flexible accumulation (Harvey 1989) or reflexive accumulation (Lash and Urry 1994). It can therefore be argued that todays’ tighter information loops allow for greater reactivity to demand, speed-to-market and short shelf-lives of commodities, but do not in themselves guarantee greater product variety and differentiation. On the contrary if used merely to imitate, i.e. to produce a version of a garment that has been created or is being worn by an iconic fashion trendsetter, than these technologies are ideally suited to churn out countless copies. It is of course not just companies’ technical ability to (re-)produce garments seen on the catwalk or elsewhere that causes product similarity, but fashion practitioners’ willingness to copy – a theme that will be explored further in section 4.2.1
Fabric and trade shows, such as Moda In and Première Vision​[10]​ which are staged approximately one year ahead of season, provide yet another example of how selective promotion legitimises specific trends as fashion and how information loops are used to effectively channel collective taste. For example, the organizers of the three day long fabric show Première Vision guide visitors in their buying decisions by providing them with so-called ‘Bests’ of each day. By consulting approximately 300 companies (40 per cent of the exhibitors) on a daily basis, they compile information on which colours and fabrics have been most frequently bought that day. They argue that this information provides ‘buyers… [with] a powerful tool … one directly plugged into both the market and the realities of fashion trends’ (Première Vision 2009). Providing information on the daily bestsellers makes the show more user-friendly as it helps manufacturers and retailers to identify the colours and fabrics others have chosen while, by the same token, this practice promotes a feeling of confidence in specific colours, fabrics etc. and raises the shows profile as being the event of the fashion year where one can see and be part of emerging trends.
As the above discussion has shown, there are several key junctures within the fashion cycle at which companies, groups and organisations in the quaternary sector limit fashion diversification by selecting and legitimating specific colours, fabrics, silhouettes, themes etc. and promoting this information to clients on the primary, secondary and tertiary sector where it functions as important sources of inspiration for companies. The discussion will now shift to the retailing sector to show how an overlap in inspirational sources and strategically perused product sameness further contribute to the formation of collective taste and the establishment of order in the fashion market.

4.2     Companies’ sources of inspiration  
It is interesting to note that in stark contrast to Blumer’s (1969) findings, none of the fashion workers interviewed in connection to this project have made reference to politics, current events, cultural movements etc., i.e. any phenomenon that expresses the Zeitgeist.​[11]​ Instead, participants’ descriptions of their inspirational sources and approach to fashion design follows a somewhat more pragmatic trajectory. Arguably, this discrepancy in findings can be explained by the fact that the two sets of participants are located at different levels of the fashion industry, i.e. at the (Paris) haute couture and high street level respectively, and that working at the level of the latter does not so much involve setting original trends, but translating information on fashion trends that have been set by others into economically successful garments (Schulz 2008).
Though Zeitgeist was clearly not seen as an inspirational source by interviewees, the analysis of the data reveals that fashion workers draw on a fairly narrow range of inspirational sources which greatly overlaps between companies. This can be demonstrated by looking at destinations chosen for buying trips. Though between them interviewees named a total of twelve different locations, it was evident that key ‘fashion cities’ (Gilbert 2006), such as Paris and New York, were of particular importance. Indeed, all nineteen participants went to Paris and seven stated that they also went to New York. Paris does not only feature as an important destination for interviewees’ buying trips, but is host to the most important fabric show in the fashion calendar – Première Vision. As the previous discussion has indicated Première Vision preforms an important function within the fashion information loop and the fact that all nineteen interviewees stated that they regularly attend this event would suggest that it plays indeed a central role in shaping fashion workers’ collective taste.
While looking at the similarities of interviewees’ destinations for buying trips and their attendance of Première Vision is insightful as it shows that there are specific key cities and events that are of importance across the sector, the remaining sources of inspiration that have been identified from the data show a difference between design-led retailers, on the one hand, and buying-led retailers and manufacturers on the other. Looking at fashion forecasting services, for example, it is evident that design-led retailers rely far less on forecasters than their buying-led/manufacturer-based counterparts: only four of seven design-led retailers compared to seven of eight buying-led retailers/manufacturers make use of these services.​[12]​ What is more, all design-led retailers employ different agencies, whereas six of the seven buying-led retailers/manufacturers subscript to the same company – which is incidentally also used by one of the design-led retailers. This means that of the eleven companies in the sample which use a dedicated forecasting service seven employ the same one. 
A difference between design-led retailers and buying-led retailer/manufacturers can also be seen in the level of influence on their work interviewees accord to top designers. Although all interviewees stated that they are aware of what happens on the catwalks of the major fashion shows, interviewees’ from design-led retailers explained that as they work further ahead of season they cannot easily respond to trends emerging on the catwalks.​[13]​ In contrast, the data suggest that top designers are a key inspirational source for buying-led retailers who work close to the season and follow them closely.
…we spend a lot of time looking at Versace and Gucci … those are the kind of looks that we take our inspiration from … most of the work we do is based … straight off the catwalks … we’re so close to the season it’s totally catwalk driven. 
(Faye, Design Manager, buying-led retailer)

The practice of copying top designers is by no way new. Ewing (1997) argues that American wholesale manufacturers were in the habit of copying and reworking Parisian couture designs for their market at the beginning of the 20th century. Indeed in 1911, recognising that the pirating of designs was inevitable, the ‘Chambre Syndicale de la Couture Parisienne’ introduced seasonal viewings for overseas buyers, who were given the option of buying models for copying. In turn ‘these copies became the department store models which the cheaper end of the trade then copied more crudely’ (Wilson and Taylor 1989, 92). Of course today’s high street designers, although they are not invited to fashion shows, can access information almost instantaneously through the coverage provided by fashion forecasting agencies. While in the past retailers’ exclusion from fashion shows helped to prevent them from copying, since the onset of the digital media they can ‘get as much imagery as they want and the designers aren't able to protect themselves … Tom Ford recently did a closed show because he didn't want it to be available for anyone to reproduce’ (Franklin cited by McClatchey 2011). Indeed, there are countless examples of catwalk trends being adapted for the high street – especially when celebrities are spotted wearing them too. McClatchey (2011), for example, shows how key themes from Prada and Gucci’s collections filtered from the catwalk to the red carpet and the UK high street.  
Even though top designers evidently still play an important role within the high street fashion system, Gronow (2001) is correct in arguing that the rigid hierarchical structure of the fashion industry, with Paris as its epicentre, has been replaced by a more democratic system that sees fashion trends originating from various sources. As McClatchey’s (2011) description of the trajectory of a trend from catwalk to high street indicates, celebrities are an example of a new set of prestige figures that impact on some sections of the womenswear industry. Indeed, all buying-led/manufacturer-based interviewees stated that celebrities are a source of inspiration, compared to none in the design-led group. The power of celebrities to set a trend or elevate a specific garment into a seasonal ‘must-have’ by adding ‘glamour prestige to the dress they look at or wear’ (Rocamora 2002, 351) was first felt by womenswear companies in the 1990s when: 

…everybody wanted anything that Geri [Halliwell] had worn … that was what teenage girls wanted and we then had to develop a whole Geri kind of trend … [or] Madonna wore a Union Jack t-shirt and that’s all we could sell…
(Lisa, Assistant Buyer, buying-led retailer) 

This points to the existence of multi-layered and multi-directional ‘circles of influence’​[14]​: on the one hand a successful singer, for instance, can create a certain style of dress or elevate a specific garment into a seasonal ‘must-have’ which the fashion industry may copy and sell, while on the other hand, she acts as important consumer of fashion whose endorsement gives kudos to a fashion brand. Indeed, a number of buying-led retailers have established links with top designers and other ‘prestige figures’ (Blumer 1969) to boost their brand image and sales, e.g. ‘Dorothy Perkins’ and Clements Ribeiro; ‘Topshop’ and Kate Moss; ‘Principles’ and Amanda Wakeley or ‘H&M’ and Karl Lagerfeld (Shields 2007). 
Although there are some differences between design-led retailers and buying-led retailers/manufacturers sources of inspiration, overall fashion workers are aware that they draw from a similar pool of information:

…everyone is actually selecting from a very narrow field, because everybody goes to PV [Première Vision], everybody goes to Petit [Filati], everybody sees the same trends, everyone sees the same magazines, the same colour predictions, the same fabrics, everybody! Whether you are in America or here … because the world has become such a small place … you’re jumping on a plane, you fly to New York for the weekend and then you come back and you pop over to Paris and then you go over to Florence and, you know, you zip over to wherever… 
(Leah, Buying Director, design-led retailer) 

            As the overlap in inspirational sources is particularly pronounced amongst buying-led retailers they face a greater problem of product sameness. One interviewee draws attention to this issue by maintaining that ‘everybody is just chasing the same end and ... the differentiation between different brands is hardly noticeable’ (Faye, Design Manager, buying-led retailer). Likewise, a design-led interviewee draws attention to buying-led retailers’ product sameness stating:

You can go to Oasis and buy a black pair of trousers and you’ve got identical ones in Warehouse and then you go to Topshop and there’s a more or less identical pair in there … you’ve got three shops where you can get exactly the same pair of trousers … it’s a bit pointless! … I think it’s lost its individuality, the cheaper end of the market.​[15]​ 
(Sarah, Designer, design-led retailer)

Indeed, whereas design-led retailers seek to develop a unique style that clearly distinguishes them from the competition, buying-led retailers aim to differentiate themselves through ‘continuous innovation’, i.e. by imitating trends and fads set by top designers and celebrities as quickly as appropriate for their specific customer group. This difference between the two groups of retailers can be seen in the following quotes:

It’s unique. I mean [this company] is ‘designed to be individual’ … it’s our corporate phrase if you like … it’s very unique … you know when you buy a [garment from us] it really is individual and original and that’s where our strength lies really, in my view.
(Eric, Senior Merchandiser, design-led retailer) 

...this end of the market, is very much a case of getting the thing in first […] It is a bit of a rat race, it is a bit [like] ‘Who is going to be first?’ with the diagonal stripe, with the black and white prints… 
	(Kate, Designer/trend co-ordinator, buying-led retailer)
  
While design-led interviewees were critical of buying-led companies’ lack of differentiation and criticised those retailers for their loss of individuality, the data suggest that buying-led interviewees accept that many of their competitors chase the same trends and that distinguishing themselves from them is not so much achieved through a company’s garment offerings, but rather their speed and ability in getting clothes onto the market – as one interviewee put it: ‘you always want to be the first to do it’ (Alicia, Buyer, buying-led retailer). What is more, product sameness is employed strategically, as the discussion of copying in the following section shows.  

4.2.1	Buying-led retailers’ practice of copying others 
As suggested in the previous discussion, top designers and celebrities – often seen through the lens of fashion forecasters’ trend reports – act as important sources of inspiration for buying-led companies who copy entire garments or key features of their designs. However, as neither top designers nor celebrities ‘produce’ garments or trends directly for the mass market, high street retailers need to interpret them, i.e. adapt and change them to suit their target customer (Schulz 2008). The ease at which a style can be adapted for the mass market will impact on the range of variation that can be found amongst retailers’ adaptions. However, it is not just top designers and celebrities who get copied: buying-led retailers also copy the ‘competition’, i.e. other fashion retailers who are perceived to be more fashion-forward or who have produced a ‘hit’ garment. As competitors’ clothes are already pitched at the high street level, the amount of ‘tweaking’ required to make a competitor’s garment work for their own target customer is relatively small. While this makes it easy for retailers to copy competitors’ garments, it also contributes to greater similarity amongst retailers as these ‘translations’ can be more literal than catwalk adaptations. 
	Nonetheless, the practice of ‘directional shopping’, i.e. buying competitors’ garments with a view to copying them, is widespread amongst buying-led retailers and allows them to actively align their product offerings and limit diversification. 

…Topshop is a great place to go for a designer and buyer, because … in their flagship store, in Oxford Circus, they sample things … to see the reaction … they put every trend in there … so it’s a really good place to go and have a look, it gives you an idea of what’s going to be around for the next, sort of, couple of months, ‘cause nobody wants to get it wrong […] If you go around the high street and you think ‘Oh, that’s good!’, you go and rip it off. And everyone rips everyone off. Which is quite (laughs) a sad thing really, but it happens. 
		(Kate, Designer/trend co-ordinator, buying-led retailer)

While buying-led interviewees stated that it is normal for them to copy competitors, all design-led interviewees strongly reject this way of working as their emphasis on stylistic uniqueness and ‘designing from scratch’, as previously discussed, are at odds with this method of copying or reworking garments.

I think if you are design-led you’ll have ... more individual products ... some buyers are very much like ‘Oh, this is the sweater to have – copy it!’ And that mentality to me is: what’s the point?! Because everybody else is going to be copying it and if you do it in an inferior quality as well, then the customer is feeling cheated, as she’ll get it for cheaper in another label.
(Sophia, Designer, design-led retailer)

Indeed, the question raised by Sophia in the above quote as to the ‘point’ of this behaviour is an important one. The data suggest that the reason many retailers follow this strategy lies in their unwillingness to risk ‘standing out’, i.e. to be seen as missing a trend or ‘to get it wrong’ (Kate, Designer/trend co-ordinator, buying-led retailer). This fear of missing a trend is symptomatic across the sample of companies as the following quotes suggest:

…if I go into every single high street store and … ‘My God! They’ve got this.’ Then obviously if we haven’t, then we’ll need to have it because, if everyone is doing it, like everyone from Whistles high street to Kookai high street, if everyone is doing it, then we should be thinking about doing our own version of that, ‘cause there are obviously people who want it and everyone’s predicted it to be big…
(Francis, Buyer, design-led retailer)

I find it probably more beneficial to go shopping for samples [i.e. garments bought from retailers] … if we take a garment into a meeting [with retail buyers] that is already made … I think … the buyers have more confidence that it’s already out there and on sale… 
(Carla, Designer, manufacturer)​[16]​

	This suggests that within a market environment that is characterised by demand uncertainty fashion workers view product sameness as a less risky strategy than potentially missing a trend. In fact, copying as a practise to deal with demand uncertainty is by no means restricted to the fashion industry.​[17]​ Sharpe (2013) maintains that ‘cinema has always used copying as a tool for creation … of the hundred highest grossing films of the last ten years, 75 of them are remakes, sequels or adaptations of source material, such as comics.’ 
This fear of ‘standing out’ and potentially missing the ‘next big thing’ can also be read as a symptom of the self-validating nature of fashion. As fashion cannot be judged objectively, i.e. it cannot be measured or proven to reside in an object, the only ‘proof’ of its existence lies in its acceptance amongst a group. It is thus safer for retailers to go along with the mass in the hope that ‘mass’ becomes ‘critical mass’ and something that has been proclaimed as fashion will indeed take off. 
5.	Conclusion
As we have seen Blumer sees collective taste as an active and structuring force and shows how taste moves ‘from an initial state of vagueness to a state of refinement and stability’ (Blumer, 1969: 334) through interactions with others. However, as this research suggests, the development of collective taste amongst high street fashion workers is not merely organic, i.e. a by-product of their interactions. The fact that these fashion workers use overlapping sources of inspiration suggests that they are immersed in a shared world of fashion which gives rise to a collective taste in a manner envisaged by Blumer, but there is a deliberateness to their taste formation – a strategic dimension – that Blumer fails to address. High street fashion workers are aware of what others in their field are doing and use this awareness to mould their own garment ranges, but the inherent demand uncertainty in the market takes their mutual awareness beyond the process of collective taste formation descripted by Blumer. Retailers’ practice of copying, ‘cannibalises’ their icons (top designers, celebrities) and each other. Fashion, and the industry associated with it, feeds off itself because of its self-validating nature. High street fashion workers develop a collective taste not simply because they are part of the same fashion world, but because a concentration of taste and ensuing product sameness can provide some economic safety. Just how strategically important the development of collective taste as a mechanism for coping with demand uncertainty is can be glimpsed from the discussion of the role of the quaternary industry sector. As we have seen, through the processes of selection and information channelling that occur in this sub-system of the fashion industry a chaotic multitude of stimuli becomes transformed into a ‘workable’ pool of inspirational sources that high street fashion workers tap into. This process of ‘taste concentration’ is akin to Bourdieu’s (1984, 230-231) observation that ‘the universe of products offered by each field of production tends in fact to limit the universe of the forms of experience (aesthetic, ethical, political etc.) that are objectively possible at any given moment.’
Collective taste, then, does not come about purely through fashion practitioners’ immersion in the fashion world and their interactions with others,  but answers to fashion companies’ economic/commercial requirements to restrain demand uncertainty. Collective taste has its basis in a number of economically motivated strategies aimed at directing and limiting choice, lessen the impact of demand uncertainty and introducing some order to the fashion industry. 
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^1	  Prestige figures, for Blumer (1969), are people who are accepted in the fashion world as being qualified to judge the value or otherwise of a design, colour etc. They are part of an elite, but not one based on social class as Veblen (1994) and Simmel (1904) for example would have it, but a fashion elite – i.e. social actors within the fashion world who are ‘recognised to be sophisticated and believed to be wise in the given area of endeavour’ (Blumer 1969, 277).
^2	  An important implication of this approach to taste-making is that social actors are treated as active agents. Though they operate within specific institutional constraints, they are not ‘prisoners of taste’ (Meyer 2000: 53) who respond to and reproduce an internalised class structure as Bourdieu (1984), for instance, would have it.  
^3	  There is an important difference between information and knowledge. Information is akin to ‘raw data’ in that it is as yet unprocessed and pre-interpreted; whereas knowledge is information that has been applied to practise (Entwistle 2009). So while agents in the quaternary sector provide companies with information, it is only through fashion workers’ interpretations that this ‘raw’ material becomes transformed into ‘contextual knowledge’ (Aspers 2006), i.e. ‘a tool … that can be used to solve tasks, in this case [i.e. high street womenswear retailing] to produce commercially successful garment ranges.’ (Schulz 2008, 395).
^4	  Interviewing styles are commonly differentiated by the degree of structure imposed on their format; this determines their position on the quantitative–qualitative research axis. While quantitative styles of interviewing (structured interviews) limit researchers’ ability to probe, impose restrictions on the wording and sequence of questions as well as respondents’ answers, semi-structured interviewing allows both researchers and interviewees to probe for clarification as well as giving both parties more latitude in the wording of their questions/responses and the themes covered during the interview.
^5	  The difference in power between designers and buyers in the two types of companies is also reflected in the designer/buyer ratio. In design-led retailers the ratio of designers to buyers is tilted in favour of the designers. For example, Sarah (designer, design-led retailer) and Anne (Fashion Director of a group of seven design-led brands) maintain that the designer/buyer ratio across their companies is 4:1. By contrast, of the five buying-led retailers in the sample, one company has no in-house designer at all, whereas two employ one person each to cover the design side. The remaining three buying-led retailers have a designer/buyer ratio of 1: 3.
^6	  Intercolor is an international non-profit organisation, which was founded in 1963.
^7	  Another example of a non-profit international colour association is the US based Color Marketing Group (CMG), which was established in 1962. ‘The members of Color Marketing Group convene throughout the year, in local and international gatherings, to discern what innovations are about to change the world, what adaptations we need to make, and which hues best express how colors evolve with the times. From discussions …, keynote speeches to firsthand workshops, trends emerge. Consensus is reached. And the palette of the future takes shape’ (Color Marketing Group 2014).
^8	  King (2011, 248) points out that at least 40% of colours are changed in such updates.
^9	  Picking out specific trends for promotion is a widespread practice amongst both forecasting agencies and the fashion media.
^10	  Founded in 1973, Première Vision is held bi-annually in Paris and is the biggest and most influential trade show within the fashion world.
^11	  Interestingly, Gronow (2001) found Zeitgeist to be an important source of inspiration for Finnish fashion designers although, like the present study, his participants’ ‘experience … was [also] received mainly from industrially produced mass fashion’ (Gronow 2001, 107). Moreover, within the global landscape of the fashion world the Finnish fashion industry occupies a ‘peripheral position [and] is on the receiving end of international influences’ (Gronow 2001, 107) – arguably more so than the UK high street fashion industry. A comparative analysis of these two fashion systems may prove to be an interesting area for future research.
^12	  The only buying-led retailer which does not employ a fashion forecasting service actually does not have its own in-house design department, but relies on its manufacturer base for design input. 
^13	  On average, design-led retailers’ seasonal lead-time, i.e. the amount of time taken up between the initial forecasting of trends and the arrival of garments in the shops, is one year while buying-led retailers’ lead-time ranges from five months to four weeks.
^14	  The media, especially in the form of women’s fashion and lifestyle magazines, also perform an important function in this process both in terms of informing their readership of fashion trends and how to achieve them by buying garments from high street retailers.   
^15	  Oasis, Warehouse and Topshop are UK based buying-led womenswear retailers.
^16	  Manufacturers also play a role in copying as they disclose information on what other retailers have bought to clients. Aligning clients’ choices allows manufacturers to increase the size and profitability of their production runs. Of course retailers can also use this information to consciously align their product offerings. In either scenario the formation of collective taste is not a by-product of the interactions between retailers and manufacturers, but a strategy to better a company’s chance of economic success that entails some form of active alignment amongst companies and a subsequent limitation of product choice.  
^17	  The tendency for cultural producers to repeat successful formulas has also been noted by Crane (1992).
